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ABSTRACT
An experiment was conducted to investigate the attribu­
tions of responsibility made by witnesses of an accident. 
Using methodological improvements including those suggested 
by Fishbein and Ajzen (1973) and Chaikin and Darley (1973), 
the defensive attribution model of Shaver (1973) was tested 
against the just world hypothesis of Lerner (1966, 1967).
Eighty male undergraduates from the College of William 
and Mary viewed a videotaped accident and were asked to 
assign responsibility for the event using Heider's levels 
model of responsibility. A 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design was 
devised in which the subjects' alleged personal similarity 
to the accident participants, their identification with the 
accident participants, and their possibility of being in a 
similar situation were manipulated.
As predicted by the defensive attribution model 
results showed that subjects made lessened attributions of 
responsibility to the perpetrator when they felt a high 
possibility of being in a similar situation in the future. 
Results were inconclusive in regards to whether the victim 
would be leniently or harshly judged as a function of 
personal similarity. Suggestions were made concerning 
subject selection criteria and manipulation salience for 
future research of the defensive attribution phenomenon.
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MOTIVATED ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
DEFENSIVE ATTRIBUTION
INTRODUCTION
Attribution theory deals with the active attempt of a 
person to bring causal order and meaning into his percep­
tions of events (Jones, Kanouse, Nisbett, Valins, & Weiner, 
1972 ; Shaver, 1975). A person employs ^ the process in order 
,to better understand and predict observed behavior. Such 
understanding and prediction is facilitated by the recog­
nizing o f underlying regularities of behavior and by the 
developing of causal chains which link events with their 
antecedents (Heider, 1958). Having ascertained the event 
and formulated hypotheses as to its occurrence, an observer 
will compare the possible causes of an event and make an in­
ference as to the probable cause of the 'observed behavior. 
Within this theoretical framework, causes of events can be 
attributed to any combination of three factors -- chance, en­
vironmental circumstances, and personal dispositions. An 
attribution of causality is based, however, on more than the 
objective behavioral information available. The attributor 
brings to the task assumptions, expectations, and personal 
needs which will affect the attribution process by filling 
in gaps in information, producing shifts in attention or 
emphasis, and relating behavioral information to comparative 
standards (.Jones et al. , 1972). Because of these subjective
2
3influences, observers of the same event frequently draw 
different and/or incorrect inferences about the causes of 
the event.
Major attribution theorists have recognized the occur­
rence of such "biased" attributions or "misattributions". 
Heider (1958), the acknowledged founder of attribution the­
ory, concluded that one factor in the attribution process 
was the "affective significance" of an event. Personally 
acceptable causes of events are sought, those which would 
put the attributer in a good light. Jones & Davis (1965) 
identified "hedonic relevance", the positive or negative 
consequences of observed behavior for the perceiver, as an 
instance of personal needs affecting attributions. Kelley 
(1967) outlined five general instances in which attributional 
errors could arise. These are cases in which: (1) the rel­
evant situational constraints on the actor are ignored;
(2) "egocentric" assumptions are made in the absence of com­
plete information; (3) the effects have affective signifi­
cance for the perceiver; (4) the surrounding situation is 
misleading; and (5) experimental manipulations deliberately 
induce attributional errors.
In spite of their recognition of "altered" or "distort­
ed" attributions, the major theorists and researchers of 
attribution processes have emphasized the objective, cogni­
tive, information processing components of the phenomenon 
(Brewer, 1977; Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones &
4Nisbett, 1971; Kelley, 1967, 1972; Miller, 1978; Miller & 
Ross, 1975; Ross, 1977). When persons produce discrepant 
attributions of causality to an event, these researchers 
hypothesize objective differences among the individuals as 
resulting in the differing attributions. An example of this 
emphasis is giyen ,,by Jones and Nisbett !s (1971) general hy­
pothesis concerning the divergent perspectives of the 
actor —  that is, the individual who performs a given behav­
ior -- and the observer of the behavior. They proposed that 
actors tend to perceive their behavior as a response to 
situational cues, while observers tend to perceive the behav­
ior as a manifestation of a disposition or quality possessed 
by the actor. They suggested that the reasons for such 
actor-obseryer differences is probably a simple perceptual 
issue*. The actor's attention at the moment of action is 
focused on the environment, the situational cues with which 
his behayior is coordinated. For the observer, however, the
salient cues are the behavior of the actor.
<
Jones and Nisbett offered another possible exp1anation 
for a differential perceptual orientation of actors and ob- 
seryers. They claimed that it stems from a difference in 
the nature and extent of information that actors as opposed 
to observers possess. In general, the actor knows more about 
his past behavior and his present experiences than does the 
obseryer. He is more likely to know about the extenuating 
circumstances surrounding his behavior, and more likely to
5locate causality away from himself.
Direct tests of this hypotheses (Harvey, Harris &
Barnes, 1975; Miller, 1975; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & 
Maracek, 1973; Wolfsoa & Salancik, 1977) as well as indirect 
sources (Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Jones & Harris, 1967; Jones, 
Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968; Regan & Totten, 1975; 
Storms, 1973; Taylor & Fiske, 1975) have provided empirical 
support for this notion of actor-observer differences.
Yet, despite the impressive track record of confirmation 
of the Jones and Nisbett hypotheses, other empirical evi­
dence suggests possible limitations (cf. Monson & Snyder, 
1977). The general conclusion drawn by these researchers 
is that attributions of actors and observers do differ, 
although not always in the direction suggested by Jones and 
Nisbett (Apsler & Friedman, 1975; Cialdini, Braver, & Lewis, 
1974; Langer & Roth, 1975). Equally interesting is the grow­
ing tendency to explain differences in terms of motivational 
distortions (Harvey, Harris, & Barnes, 1975; Miller & Norman, 
1975; Monson & Snyder, 1977) or in terms of the conceptually 
different tasks facing actors and observers when explaining 
an event, with implications of motivated distortions (cf.
Buss, 19 78).
Another example of the emphasis on the objective, ra­
tional aspects of the attribution process is a line of re­
search derived from Shaw and Sulzer's study (1964) on attri­
‘6
butions of responsibility. Shaw and Sulzer's approach was 
to view attributions of responsibility in terms of the 
attributer's level of cognitive sophistication (Sulzer, 1971) 
or in terms of their stage of development (Fishbein' & Ajzen, 
1973). Heider (1958) originally identified five levels in 
which attributions of responsibility to a person vary as the 
relative contributions of person and environment change.
These levels represent a progression from relatively primi­
tive to relatively sophisticated cognitive processes. The 
levels have been restated and labeled by Shaw and Sulzer 
(1964) and by Sulzer (1971) as follows:
Level 1 Association: The person is held respon­
sible for any outcome that he is connected 
with in any way.
Level. 2. Causality: The person is held responsible
for any effect that he produced by his 
actions, even though he could not have fore­
seen the consequences of his actions.
Level 3 Foreseeability: The person is held respon­
sible for any foreseeable effect that he 
produced by his actions even though the 
effect was not a part of his goals or in­
tentions .
Level 4 Intentlonality: The person is held respon­
sible for any effect that he produced by
7his actions, foreseeing the outcome and 
•intending to produce the effects.
Level 5 Justifiability: The person is held only
partly responsible for any effects that he 
intentionally produced if the circumstances 
were such that most persons would have felt 
and acted as he did. Responsibility for 
the act is shared by the coercive environ­
ment .
In studies of this levels model of attributions of re­
sponsibility, subjects read a standard set of stories 
created by Shaw and Sulzer (1964). For each story, the sub­
jects are asked to assess the responsibility of the stimulus 
person for causing negative or positive consequences. Levels 
model researchers are concerned with the differences in 
attributions of responsibility made by subjects as a func­
tion of their "different developmental levels or cultural 
backgrounds 11 .
A different approach to attribution research is rep­
resented by investigations in which the focus is on attri­
butions which are motivationally altered or distorted. 
Specifically, these studies stress the importance of a 
particular motivation--perceiver self-protection.
Studies dealing with self-protective attributions 
(variously) labeled ego-defensive, ego-protective, or ego-
biased attributions, can be grouped into three general areas: 
studies of the locus of causality attributed for success 
and failure (Bradley, 1978; Feather, 1969, 1971; Feather &
Simon, 1971; Sicoly & Ross, 1977; Streufert & Streufert,
1969; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest & Rosenbaum, 1971; 
Weiner & Kula, 1970 ; Wolfson & Salancik, 1977 ; Lerner’s 
research on the need to believe in a just world (Lerner & 
Simmons, 1966; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner & Miller,
1978; and studies of responsibility assignment for accidental 
occurrences (Chaiken & Darley, 1973; McKillip & Posovac,
1972; Schroeder & Linder, 1976, Shaver, 1970, 1971;
Sorrentino & Boutilier, 1974; Walster, 1966, 1967). It 
is the last two areas of research which are of particular 
interest in this paper. These studies have generated several 
hypotheses regarding self-protective attributions which would 
not have been predicted nor readily explained by the tradi­
tional objective information processing models of attri­
bution .
*
Lerner (1966, 1970) hypothesized that people have a need
to believe that they live in a just world, one in which suf­
fering people deserve what they get. According to Lerner, 
their suffering has three possible causes: the victim’s own
overt behavior, his low intrinsic personal worth, or 
"chance". The latter possibility is unacceptable to the 
perceiver of misfortune, for were he to attribute misfortune
9to the chance factors of a capricious world, this would imply 
that such suffering was beyond anyone’s power to control.
He, too, could fall victim to such fate. !
The observer of such suffering prefers, rather, to con­
vince himself that the victim was in some way behaviorally 
responsible for his own misfortune, or that the victim was 
characterologically responsible for his suffering (i.e.,
Though innocent by deed, the victim deserves his fate by 
virtue of his undesirable personal qualities.)
The general paradigm employed in just world studies has 
observers evaluate the personal worth of a suffering victim 
under conditions which make it clear that nothing about the 
victim’s overt behavior is responsible for his plight. As 
predicted, the results show derogation of the victim, indi­
cating that perceivers believe the victim "deserves what he 
gets". Assuming that the observer thinks of himself as a 
good'person, the self-protective belief in justice removes the 
threat posed by the negative occurrence.
Walster (1966) provided the prototype for a line of re­
search regarding the motivationally distorted attributions 
of responsibility for an accident with a study in which the 
perpetrator of an accident, rather than the victim as in 
Lerner and Simmons (1966), was the focus of attention. She 
initially found that the more severe the consequences of an 
accident, the more the perpetrator would be judged respon­
sible. According to Walster, the perceiver of the accident
10
would be threatened were he to attribute responsibility for 
the accident to chance factors. Such an attribution implies
that he, too, could be in a similar situation of causing
\
the negative consequences befalling the victim. In a self- 
protective move, the perceiver judges the perpetrator as 
responsible for the accident, while denying that he could be 
in a similar situation, or that if he were, that he would 
act differently than the perpetrator.
Whereas both Lerner's just world hypothesis and Walster's 
hypothesis predict that a perceiver would]attribute respon­
sibility to the victim or the ^perpetrator (with self-
protective denial of situational and/or personal similarity
✓
to the victim or perpetrator), in a series of experiments
Shaver (1970) obtained and explicated results which were not 
*
in keeping with these predictions. Shaver found the height­
ened probability of occurrence, especially in the form of 
personal similarity to the potential perpetrator, lessened
the observer's attributions of responsibility and increased
(
his ascriptions of carefulness to the perpetrator. Shaver 
suggested that his finding may reflect "defensive attribu­
tion" (e.g., I may cause a similar accident in the future.
If I’ do, I will want people to think chance was responsible 
and not I.) The subjects exhibiting defensive attributions 
were, according to Shaver, concerned with avoiding not only 
potential threats to their self esteei and/or physical 
safety (as suggested by Walster and Lerner) but also poten-
11
tial blameworthiness. The lessened attributions of respon­
sibility to the perpetrator reported by Shaver indicated 
that a person would prefer to belieye in a capricious world 
rgther than belieye that he himself could potentially be 
responsible-blameworthy for negatiye consequences to others. 
Sh.ayer (1970, 19731 formulated a defensive attribution model 
Which, encompassed the various self-protective attribution 
hypotheses and suggested the probable parameters of the 
ph-enpmouon.
Shayerfs defensive attribution model stresses two dimen­
sion's, which, are factors in the occurrence of self-protective 
attributions of responsibility; situational possibility and 
personal similarity. Situational possibility refers to the 
ohseryer!s perceiyed probability of finding himself in 
similar circumstances as the stimulus person (victim or 
perpetrator) of an accident. As originally identified by 
Walster .(19-56) , a prerequisite for the occurrence of self- 
pro tec tiye attributions of responsibility is the possibility 
tb&t the accident could befall the perceiver. As an ex- 
a^mple, an account of a window washer’s fall might be of 
little import to a store clerk, but would probably be quite 
threatening to another window washer. The higher the pro­
bability of the perceiver's confronting a similar situation, 
the more threatening will be his use of defensive attribu- 
tiqns. of responsibility.
The direction of self-protective attributions of respon­
sibility (higher assignment of responsibility to the stimulus 
person a la Walster or Lerner, or lessened assignment of res­
ponsibility to the stimulus person a la Shaver) is influenced 
by the second dimension— personal similarity. Personal 
similarity refers to a concept of congruence of experiences, 
attitudes, beliefs, and personality traits. As an example, 
a female college junior might feel little similarity to a 
male high school senior, somewhat more similarity to a female 
college freshman, and perhaps much similarity to a female 
college senior. Given situational possibility, the less 
similar the observer of an accident feels to the stimulus 
person, the more heavily he will attribute responsibility 
for the accident to the stimulus person. Simultaneously, 
the observer will assert his dissimilarity and might also 
derogate the suffering victim (Lerner & Simmons, 1966).
Thus, the ob.server has avoided the threat of a capricious 
world by attributing responsibility for the accident to the 
stimulus person and, likewise, avoided the threat of this 
potentially harsh standard of judgment to himself by 
asserting his dissimilarity to the stimulus person (I 
would not act in the same way. I fm not deserving of suffer- 
ing as he was.)
Given high situational possibility, the more similarity 
the observer of an accident perceives between himself and 
the stimulus person, the less he will assign responsibility
13
for an accident to the stimulus person and the less he will 
derogate the stimulus person. The observer cannot assume 
that he would act differently or be less deserving of suf­
fering than the stimulus person since he perceives himself 
as being similar to the stimulus person. He establishes, 
therefore, a lenient standard of judgment (i.e., lessened 
attributions of responsibility) by which he would want to 
be evaluated if and when he is also involved in a similar 
misfortune. Shaver’s defensive attribution formulation has 
been supported by evidence from a number of researchers 
(Chaikin & Darley, 1973; McKillip & Posovac, 1972; Schroeder 
& Linder, 1976; Shaver, 1970, 1971; Sorrentino & Bouti-
lier, 1974).
Despite the empirical evidence and intuitive appeal of 
a defensive attribution phenomenon, there remains a hesi­
tancy to accept the notion of motivation having an effect 
on attributions. A major critique of the motivated attri­
bution of responsibility literature comes from Fishbein 
and Ajzen (1973). They portray the research as suffering 
from two principal' deficiencies--(1) the lack of a guiding 
theoretical schema and (2) the contextual ambiguity of 
the accident situations typically presented to the sub­
jects. Emphasizing the success of Shaw and his associates 
(Shaw and Sulzer, 1964; Sulzer, 1971) in cross cultural 
and developmental investigations of attributions of respon­
sibility using Heider’s levels model of responsibility, they
1.4
suggested that researchers should likewise utilize the 
Heiderian framework. Fishbein and Ajzen proposed that assign­
ments of responsibility, rather than being contradictory and 
uninterpretable, would follow predictable patterns when the 
contextual level of the stimulus person's behavior in the 
accident is clearly specified and when the subjects are 
told at what level of responsibility they are to respond to 
the question "Is the stimulus person responsible for the 
accident?"
In a rebuttal to their criticisms, Shaver (1973) pre­
sented his model of defensive attribution mentioned above 
and suggested that it be used as a theoretical guideline for 
further research in the area. He also pointed out Fishbein 
and Ajzen's lack of appreciation for the content and goals 
of motivated distortion of attributions of responsibility re­
search. Motivated distortion researchers are not interested 
in the ability of subjects to make rational judgments in the 
face of undeniable evidence as is the case of Shaw and 
associates. Rather, they attempt to determine what factors 
must be present to' motivate an observer to distort his per­
ception of the causal chain of events leading to an accident 
in order to avoid feelings of vulnerability or empathic cul­
pability. Walster (1966) originally noted that such pro­
tective tendencies will be strongest when the "objective 
evidence as to the responsibility of the stimulus person is 
ambiguous" (p. 74). Shaver described the ambiguous context
15
of motivated distortion studies (which Fishbein and Ajzen 
condemned as a methodological deficiency but which Walster 
claimed as important to eliciting the phenomenon) as falling 
between Heider1s levels of Causality and Foreseeability. The 
stimulus person is readily seen as having caused the accident, 
but whether or not he foresaw or intended the results of 
his action is unknown. This ambiguity allows the perceiver 
to exaggerate according to his needs the accountability and 
culpability of the stimulus person for causing the accident. 
Rather than a fault of the method, contextual ambiguity is 
a methodological necessity in this area of research.
Schroeder and Linder (1976) empirically verified and 
elucidated the role of contextual ambiguity in defensive 
attribution research. They proposed that an initial attri­
bution of causality to the stimulus person is essential to 
the eliciting of defensive attributions. How is it that 
Walster considered contextual ambiguity helpful in elicit­
ing defensive attributions, while Shaver maintained that 
the stimulus person is readily seen as having caused the 
accident, and Schroeder and Linder contended that the 
initial attribution of causality to the stimulus person is 
absolutely essential for the occurrence of defensive attri­
butions? Schroeder and Linder pointed out that several 
attributions are being made in assigning responsibility 
for an accident. As noted by Heider (1958), a hierarchy of 
attribution processes may exist. An observer's naive
16
analysis of the sequence of events yields only the informa­
tion that some entity (person, environment, or chance) has 
caused some effect. Additional meaning may then be attached 
to the causal entity by the observer; attributions concerning 
the entity’s abilities, desires, intentions, and respon­
sibility for the effect. Assignments of responsibility, 
then, may be considered second order attributions which 
follow an observer’s first order to determination of the 
most probable cause of an accident. It is during this second­
ary processing that self-protective tendencies may be mani­
fested. If initial causality can be objectively assigned 
to entities in the event other than the stimulus person 
(e.g., chance or environmental factors), no threat to the 
observer’s self-image or potential blameworthiness should 
be aroused, and attributions of responsibility should not 
be defensively distorted. Only when the stimulus person is 
perceived as the probable cause of the accident, and the 
observer feels similar to the st imulus person and feels 
that he could be in a similar situation, will distorted 
attributions of responsibility be aroused. Defensive assign-
i
ments may, then, be conceptualized as a two-stage process.
The observer must first perceive the stimulus person as a 
primary causal agent of events for which the observer would 
not want to be blamed. Then, motivated by a need to avoid 
feelings of potential blameworthiness or vulnerability, the 
observer assigns a lesser degree of responsibility to the
17
stimulus person.
Germane to the issue of a two step attribution process 
is the distinction made by Shaver (1975) among the various 
meanings of the term "responsible" -- causality, legal 
accountability, or moral accountability. As causality, respon­
sibility refers simply to the production of effects. As legal 
accountability, responsibility refers to not only the effects 
which a person produces but also to effects which he does not 
directly produce (e.g., legal responsibility of parents for 
the actions of their children). As moral accountability, 
responsibility is a value judgment made by a perceiver of an 
event, and as such, is not always totally rational and ob­
jective. Heider’s hierarchy of attributions and Schroeder 
and Linder’s* first and second order attributions can be viewed 
as employing these various interpretations of the term respon­
sibility. First order attributions correspond to Shaver’s 
"causality" meaning of responsibility; second order attribu­
tions to his moral accountability meaning. In this regard, 
the suggestion of Fishbein and Ajzen to utilize Heider’s 
levels model of responsibility is well taken. If an ob­
server is asked to assign responsibility for an accident, 
would he respond with a first order responsibility attribu­
tion (causality) or with a second order attribution (moral 
accountability)? By using a form of the levels model, the 
interpretation of the term responsible would be controlled 
by the investigator. The responses of the observers may
18S
no longer be ambiguous (contradictory and uninterpretable) 
even though the context of the second order attribution re­
mained so.
Other prevailing methodological problems in distorted 
attribution research have been discussed by Chaiken and 
Darley (1973) and Vidmar and Crinklaw (1974). Chaikin and 
Darley pointed out that the accident descriptions which were 
used tended to confuse the roles of perpetrator and vietim 
of the accident. In the auto accident story used by Walster 
(1966) and Shaver (1970), for example, the teenaged boy 
perpetrated the accident by parking his car on a steep hill 
and was also a vietim of the resulting accident in that his 
car was damaged. In addition, reading descriptions of acci­
dents might not be as threatening an event as actually view­
ing an accident via videotape, for example. Finally, ob­
server identification with victim or perpetrator of an 
accident has generally not been manipulated as a function 
of situational possibility. Related to this issue is the 
fact that the consequences of the accidents in most defen­
sive attribution studies have included personal injury -and/
I
or property damage. The probability of such an occurrence 
is rather low and too readily denied by observers as being 
applicable to them to serve as a viable situational possi­
bility manipulation.
The present study included procedures to avoid poten­
tial problems as noted by Chaikin and Darley and to consider
the suggestion of Fishbein and Ajzen. First, the victim 
of the accident was separated from its perpetrator. Second, 
a videotape presentation of the accident was used rather 
than a non-involving description of the event. Third, not 
only did the subjects actually witness the accident, they 
also were led to believe that they would be placed in a 
situation in which a similar accident could be caused by 
them or could happen to them. There was no subjective 
appraisal on the part of the perceiver as to the possi­
bility of his being in a similar situation. Fourth, the 
accident consequences were not improbable physical injury 
or property damage, but the very possible loss of monetary 
reward for the task the subjects were to participate in. 
Fifth, the subjects were led to identify with either the 
victim or the perpetrator by manipulation of both situa­
tional possibility and personal similarity. Sixth, as 
mentioned above, Shaver distinguished among several meanings 
of responsibility and concluded that attribution research­
ers are referring to moral accountability when they ask if 
the stimulus person is responsible for an accident. Shaver 
questioned, however, whether or not subjects responded to 
the same interpretation. Using a Heiderian levels model 
of responsibility, as suggested by Fishbein and Ajzen, sub­
jects responded to dependent measures tapping the various 
degrees and interpretations of the term responsibility.
Finally, Shaver (1971, 1973, 1975) referred to personal­
ity variables as probably being influential in a person's 
assignments of responsibility. In his 1971 study, he suggest­
ed that the results may have been confounded by the 'inordinate 
concentration in one of the treatment cells of subjects 
high on Harmavoidance as measured by the Personality Re- 
search Form (Jackson, 1968). Jackson described a person 
who scored high on the Harmavoidance Scale as self-protecting, 
pain avoiding, attending to danger, withdrawing from danger, 
and seeking safety. Harmavoidance seemed to be a trait 
which intuitively and empirically (though post hoc, Shaver, 
1971) could affect responsibility assignments. Research 
involving personality types as defined by Rotter's Internal- 
External Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966) has provided 
empirical support for the suspicion that personality 
variables could affect attributions of responsibility 
(Phares, Wilson, & Klyver, 1971; Sosis, 1974). In the
present study, cell populations were matched on Jackson's 
Harmavoidance trait and the intuition that this trait could 
affect attributions of responsibility was tested in an addi­
tional analysis of the data.
From Shaver's defensive attribution model, it was pre­
dicted that subjects who felt personally similar to the 
perpetrator and who expected to play a role in which the 
previous role occupant perpetrated an accident would attri­
bute responsibility for the accident less to the perpetrator
21
and more to the situational circumstances or chance in 
order to defend themselves from potential blame in the 
future. Specifically, those subjects whose fate and person­
ality characteristics are similar to the perpetrator would, 
a la Schroeder and Linder (1976), attribute causality to the 
perpetrator as would the other subjects. They would differ 
from the other subjects in that they would then attribute 
less Foreseeability and Intentionality to the perpetrator. 
How the subjects respond to the multi-interpretable term 
Responsibility cannot be predicted for the meaning of the 
word responsible is not being directly controlled by the 
experimenter. One may be able, however, to determine the 
implied interpretation of Responsibility by comparing sub­
ject responses to the various levels of responsibility, 
e*g., Causality, Foreseeability, and Intentionality, with 
their response to Responsibility. These same fate and per­
sonality similar subjects would also be more inclined to 
believe in a "capricious11 world rather than one in which 
they would be judged "responsible" for negative consequences. 
Therefore, they would tend more than other subjects to 
blame chance factors or situational circumstances rather 
than the perpetrator of the accident. Concerning the vic­
tim of the accident, given the just world hypothesis, the 
victim of an accident would either be blamed for the acci­
dent and/or disliked in order to justify the harm done to 
him. However, this effect might not be found among persons
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who felt similar to the victim and who expected to play a 
role in which they might become a victim. That is, by de­
valuing the victim in order to maintain a belief in a just 
world, they are potentially devaluing themselves. It is 
predicted that those subjects whose fate and personality 
characteris tics are s imilar would no t devalue the inno cent 
victim. Specifically, in response to inquiries into the 
Likeability, Blameworthiness and Responsibility of the 
Victim, defensively aroused subjects would not perceive the 
victum less favorably than would other subjects.
METHOD
Sub j ect s . Ninety male Introductory Psycho logy students 
at the College of William and Mary volunteered for a paid 
experiment ostensibly investigating the correlations between 
personality variables and spatial imagery ability. Eighty- 
five subjects were actually contacted and used. One of them 
produced unscorable responses, two failed to understand the 
instructions, one admitted prior knowledge of the experi­
ment, and one was discarded due to experimenter error, 
leaving a total of eighty subjects.
Design Overview. A 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design with two 
levels of situational possibility (High; Low), two levels of 
stimulus person identification (Perpetrator; Victim), and 
two levels of personal similarity (Similar-Dissimilar) was 
employed. The txiro levels of expected task provide a situa­
tional possibility manipulation: the Actors represent a
High situational possibility (High) Group who believe they 
will be involved in the same task they are viewing, and 
the Observers represent a Low situational possibility 
Group (Low) who have no reason to believe that they will ever 
be involved in a similar task. The two levels of stimulus 
person identification establish a focus of attention on 
either the Perpetrator of the accident or the Victim. These
2 3
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two independent variables determine the situational possi­
bility of the accident for the subjects and their potential 
role in it. Ten subjects were randomly assigned to each 
of the eight conditions.
Stimulus Material. A ten minute videotape purported 
to be of two colleagues who also volunteered for the alleged 
spatial imagery experiment was prepared. The film was os­
tensibly to serve as a demonstration training film of the 
experimental task for which the subjects had volunteered.
In reality, the tape served as a vehicle to present the acci­
dent to the subjects and contained two students who acted 
under the direction of the experimenter. The videotape 
presented the following scenario:
The subjects in the videotape were given instructions by 
the experimenter for performing the spatial imagery task.
They were sitting at a small table with a screen between them. 
One subject, called the Reader (Perpetrator), had a stopwatch, 
pencil, tally sheet, and description cards in front of him.
The other subject, called the Builder (Victim), had twenty- 
seven WAIS Block Design blocks (Each block was a one inch 
cube with two sides red, two sides white, and two sides 
divided diagonally, half red-half white.). The perpetrator 
was instructed to read the description of block designs from 
his cards one at a time, proceeding when the Victim said to. 
The Perpetrator was to time the trials, allowing only three 
minutes per design. Following completion of the third time
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trial, the Perpetrator was to go to the Victimfs side of 
the screen and score the performance of the Victim. The 
Perpetrator was to make note of each properly placed block 
in the Victim’s designs, comparing them to the pictures of 
the designs on his description cards. The experimenter 
would pay the Victim 25£ for each properly placed block in 
his structures, thus, the Victim could make as little as 
$0.00 or as much as $6.75, depending on his performance as 
tallied by the Perpetrator. The Perpetrator was told that 
he would be paid $3.00 for his participation.
The video Victim was told to listen to the descriptions 
of the structures and attempt to build them using the blocks 
provided him. His reward contingency was reiterated -- 
$0.00 to $6.75, depending on the number of correctly placed 
blocks recorded by the Perpetrator. The Victim was en­
couraged to do his best and told that he would have only one 
chance to perform the task.
Their instructions completed, the subjects in the video­
tape proceeded to perform the task. It seemed moderately 
difficult, but the Victim did quite well (twenty-four of 
twenty-seven.blocks correctly placed). The time expired and 
the Perpetrator got up to tally the Victim’s performance.
In getting up from the cramped experimental set-up, the 
Perpetrator "accidentally** bumped the table and knocked over 
the block structures of the Victim. The tape ended.
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Procedure. Introductory Psychology students were asked 
to participate in a two part study purportedly of the cor­
relations between personality variables and spatial imagery 
ability. Part 1 would consist of their being administered 
the Personality Research Form (Jacksons 1968), completing 
this personality inventory, and returning it to the exper­
imenter. In Part II, they would be contacted by telephone 
and appointments made for them to perform the task ostensibly 
being studied. They were told that their total time commit­
ment would be approximately one hour, for which they would 
be paid.
Ninety Personality Research Forms were returned completed.
The subscale Harmavoidance was scored for each subject and
a stratified random sampling procedure with Harmavoidance 
%
level .as criterion was used to assign subjects across condi­
tions. (A frequency distribution of Harmavoidance scores was 
developed and divided into centile groups. This distribu­
tion was nearly identical to normative data compiled by 
Jackson, 1968.) The subjects were contacted by telephone 
and appointments made for them to perform Part II of the 
experiment. The contacts went as follows:
I ’m Glenn Paule-Carres, the graduate student for
(
whom you completed the Personality Research Form.
I am now conducting Part II of the study and want 
to know if you could make a % hour session tomorrow 
at x o ’clock in Room 125? I’d like to stress the
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importance of your keeping this appointment, since 
I am coordinating four schedules— yours, your 
experimental partner’s, my assistant's, and mine.
In other words, three of us will be expecting you 
at x o'clock. If for some reason you cannot make 
it, call me and we will try to arrange a new time. 
We'll see you tomorrow at x o'clock, Room 125.
Eight appointments were made for each experimental session. 
The eight subjects were of the same Harmavoidance level 
(centile group) and were randomly assigned to the eight 
experimental conditions, with the restriction that each 
condition contained only one subject from each Harmavoid­
ance level. Of a total of 85 subjects contacted, only two 
subjects failed to meet their initial appointment. They 
were assigned new times which they did not miss.
Situational Possibility Manipulation. Upon arrival, 
the subject was met by the experimenter's assistant. The 
assist ant read an introductory atatement whi ch established 
two High-Low and Perpetrator-Victim of the three independent 
variable manipulations being performed. Together, these 
two manipulations comprised the possibility of the subject 
being in a similar situation and role as that of the stimulus 
person in the videotape. Two of the eight subjects who ar­
rived during an experimental session were randomly assigned 
to each of four possible High-Low - Perpetrator-Victim 
conditions. The assistant read one of four introductory
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statements to each subject, it being determined by the sub­
ject’s condition assignment. The statements were as 
follows:
High Victim
You are here today to participate in a study of 
the relationships between personality traits and 
spatial imagery ability. You will be performing 
a two-man task with another intro psych student.
He has already finished this training session, so 
he will be joining us later. To acquaint you with 
the task, we have prepared a short demonstration 
film which explains and illustrates the essential 
aspects of the task. The subjects in the film 
came ,from an intro psych class and are performing 
* the same task, with slightly different problems, 
of course, which you and your partner will be 
doing, so pay attention. You have been randomly 
assigned the builder duty in your task. This 
name will make sense to you when you see the film. 
Remember, you will be the builder in your task.
.In the High Perpetrator condition, the subject was read 
the same statement except that the word builder was re­
placed by the word reader. In the Low Perpetrator-Vietira 
conditions, the subject was told that he would not be per­
forming the task. He was merely to observe the film paying
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particular attention to the builder (or reader).
Similarity Manipulation. Personal similarity was de­
fined in terms of personality traits rather than attitudes. 
This was done for several reasons. First, personality 
traits are presumably more enduring, more basic a guiding 
principle of behavior than attitudes. Personality similar­
ity would imply a greater probability of like behavior, 
particularly under the stressful conditions of an accident, 
and, therefore, would be more threatening a similarity mani­
pulation. Second, studies (e.g., Reader and English, 1947; 
Izard, 1960) showed that personality similarity is less 
related to attraction than is attitudinal similarity. 
Differential attraction to the stimulus person based on si­
milarity would present a problem in this experiment, there­
fore, it was minimized by employing personality trait simi­
larity. Third, attitudinal similarity has been show to pro­
duce increases in perceived morality (Byrne, 1961) and in 
estimated competence (Jones, Bell and Aronson, 1973), both 
of which might influence attributions of responsibility.
The communication of personality similarity or differ­
ence was accomplished by using the Personality Research 
Form which was administered earlier to the pool of Intro­
ductory Psychology students and, then scored on the Harm­
avoidance subscale. After receiving the situational possi­
bility manipulation from the assistant, the subject was led 
into the experiment room where the experimenter was waiting
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with the video monitor and the spatial imagery experiment 
apparatus. The experimental apparatus (table, screen, 
block design cards, blocks, etc.) were located in a corner 
of the small room. The subject was asked to take a seat 
in front of the monitor. The assistant handed the experi­
menter a card with the third independent variable manipu- 
lation— Personal Similarity. The assistant was unaware of 
this manipulation while he interacted with the subject, 
and the experimenter was unaware of the Situational Possi­
bility Role manipulation performed by the assistant in the 
introductory statement. The experimenter read one of two 
.possible statements which the assistant randomly assigned,
with the restriction that the factorial design was main­
tained. The statements were as follows:
Similar
Take a seat in front of the TV. We are interested 
in the effect of personality traits on spatial 
imagery ability. Do you remember the Personality 
Research Form? (holding up the subject's form) The 
PRF is a standard device used to measure personality 
traits. The results of these tests allow us to 
compare subjects on personality traits and divide 
them basically, into groups. Comparing your PRF 
results with those of the subjects in the film,
you are similar to the fellows performing the task
in the film. Following this demonstration film,
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you will answer some questions about the task 
situation and the experiment in general. If you 
are going to perform the task your partner will 
be here by then. O.K.? Watch the film. It is 
approximately nine minutes long and ends abruptly, 
but don’t be concerned by that. Remember, you 
are similar to the subjects in the film.
For the dissimilar condition, the statement was identical 
except for the replacing of the word similar with dissimilar. 
The experimenter turned on the videotape and left the room.
Pretest. In a pretest, twenty subjects received only
the personal similarity manipulation and viewed the video
film up until the point before the accident. The efficacy 
%
of the similarity manipulation was established. Subjects 
who were told that based on their Personality Research Form 
profiles they were similar to the video subjects rated 
themselves significantly more similar to the stimulus person 
than those subjects who were told that they were dissimilar, 
t^(18)=4.81, p <. 00 1, (}£=4 . 1 vs. X=5.9). In addition, neither 
of the two video subjects was differentially liked (cf.
Regan, Straus, & Fazio, 1974) and the Victim’s performance 
was perceived as being near maximum. Questioning the sub­
jects showed the cover experiment on spatial imagery to 
be both feasible and credible. An additional fifteen sub­
jects viewed the tape through the accident and attested to
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the apparent reality of the accident.
Dependent Variables. Following the videotape, the ex­
perimenter joined the subject and led him to another room. 
The experimenter presented the subject with a folder con­
taining the questionnaires and the following instructions:
High
Enclosed are two short questionnaires. Fill them 
out and then we will get you and your partner to 
perform the task. The computer print-out form 
deals with the major issues of my study. I would 
appreciate your quick and honest responses to its 
items. The second form has questions dealing with 
what happened at the very end of the tape. Budget 
cuts prevented us from re-taping the session. The 
tape is, nonetheless, a good training demonstration 
of the task, so we kept it. We felt that what 
happened at the very end did point out some issues 
which might be worth investigating, so would you 
please answer some questions about it too?
For subjects in the Low condition the "and then we will get 
you 'and your partner to perform the task" phrase was deleted 
from the instructions.
The first questionnaire was a very formal, important 
looking computer print-out containing statements about the 
bogus e:xperimental task with Likert Scale responses. This
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questionnaire served several purposes. First, its formal­
ity and impressiveness lended credence to the assertion 
that the study truly dealt with the bogus spatial imagery 
experiment (Chaikin and Darley, 1973). This took the 
emphasis off of the "unimportant" second questionnaire 
which contained the relevant dependent variables. This, 
hopefully, resulted in less defensive, more spontaneous 
responses to the second questionnaire than would be expected 
if the subjects believed it to be the major concern of the 
study. Second, it acquainted the subject with Likert-type 
scaling, so that he would have no problem in understanding 
the technique of responding when he got to the relevant 
questionnaire. Third, the identifying information at the 
beginning the first questionnaire made the subject ack­
nowledge his awareness of the manipulation performed on 
him and once more reminded him of the conditions before he 
answered the questionnaires.
The second questionnaire contained the dependent vari­
ables. It was less formal looking— typed and xeroxed. This 
was in line with the assertion that it was of secondary im­
portance, only an inquisitive addendum to the real study.
It contained twenty-five items with Likert-type response 
continua of unbroken lines with labeled endpoints. These 
items asked questions about the accident and the subj ect’s 
impressions of the Perpetrator and the Victim, particularly 
in regard to the accident.
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When the subject finished the second questionnaire, 
the experimenter returned to the room and fully debriefed, 
paid and thanked the subject for participating in the 
study.
RESULTS
The response continua of dependent measures were divided 
by a scoring key into eight equal intervals. The data were 
scored from one to nine, the higher the score, the more of 
the variable in question. The data, scored, were then ana­
lyzed in a 2 x 2 x 2 (expected task (High-Low) by stimulus 
person identification (Perpetrator-Victim) by personal simi­
larity (Similar-Dissimilar) ) analysis of variance which was 
prepared by the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner & Brent, 1975).
Manipulation Checks. At the beginning of the first%
questionnaire each subject was asked to supply the following 
identifying information:
Name:
Age:
Date:
Circle One: Future Builder Future Reader
Observe Builder Observe Reader
Circle One: Similar to subjects in film
Dissimilar to subjects in film 
Eighty-two of eighty-five subjects correctly acknowledged 
the manipulation-instructions which they received. Thus, 
it was possible to assume that the subjects were aware of
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and understood the manipulation-instructicns which they re­
ceived. Because the subjects provided this acknowledgment 
before they responded to the questionnaire items, they were 
unable to deny (during debriefing, for instance) awareness 
and/or understanding of the instructions in order to not 
be held responsible for their responses to the dependent 
measures .
In a check to see if the accident was perceived as 
having negative consequences for the Victim, the subject 
was asked "How much did the Builder make as a reward for 
■his performance?" with $0.00 and $6.75 serving as endpoints 
of the Likert-type scale. The mean response was 4.2. This 
compared to a pretest mean of 7.25 for twenty subjects who 
viewed the videotape until just before the accident occurred. 
This difference was highly significant, £(98) = 4.26,
<.001, but the experimental mean of 4.2 (which equates to 
approximately $3.50) seemed rather high reward for a perfor­
mance that was apparently negated by the accident.
To insure that the similarity manipulations had been 
perceived as intended ("Based on the personality test you 
are similar, or dissimilar, to the students in the video­
tape."), subjects responded to four items designed to be 
manipulation checks. . Table 1 presents the mean responses 
to these items. When asked "How similar are the reader's 
(Perpetrator) personality traits to yours?", a Sim-Dis 
main effect was obtained with the subjects in the Sim
Me
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condition rating themselves as more similar, F.(l, 72) =
4.21, £ <.04. Likewise, a Sim-Dis main effect in the intend­
ed direction was obtained on the item "How similar are the 
builder's (Victim) personality traits to yours?", F.(l, 72) = 
4.42, g<.037, with subjects in the Sim conditions rating 
themselves as more similar. Given these main effects, it 
appears that the similarity manipulation was effective.
In addition, interaction effects were obtained on both 
items. For "reader's personality traits similar", a Per- 
petrator-Victim by Sim-Dis interaction was highly signi­
ficant, F(l, 72) = 7 . 49 , £<.008, indicating that the Sim- 
Dis manipulation was heightened among subjects attending 
to the Perpetrator than among those focusing on the Victim. 
For "builder's personality traits similar", a High-Low 
by Petpetrator-Victim interaction was almost significant,
£(1 , 72) - 3 . 75 , £<.054, with similarity to the Victim 
being better, reflected among LSP-Victim subjects. It was 
as though the low situational possibility of their being 
in circumstances as the Victim allowed them to claim a 
higher personal similarity to the Victim than others who 
expected to be performing the same task as the Victim.
In response to the question "How similar are the 
reader's (Perpetrator) beliefs, attitudes, and values to 
yours?", no differences were obtained. To the question "How 
similar are the builder's (Victim) beliefs, attitudes, and 
values to yours?", a significant Sim-Dis main effect was
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obtained, F(l, 72) = 7.49, £<.008, with those in the Sim 
conditions claiming more similarity. A Perpetrator-Victim 
main effect was also obtained which approached significance, 
F,(l, 72) = 3.75, £<.054, with those subjects focusing on
the Victim claiming more similarity.
Responsibility of_ Perpetrator.
Causality. Tables 2 and 3 present the mean ratings of 
the dependent measures which tested the first prediction—  
High Situational Possibility-Similar-Perpetrators would 
attribute less responsibility for the accident to the Per­
petrator. Included in the tables are the variables 
Causality, Responsibility, Foreseeability, and Intentional- 
ity. When asked if the Perpetrator caused what happened at 
the end of the tape, no differences were obtained and the 
high mean responses (7.6 - 8.4) indicated that the Per­
petrator was clearly seen as the probable cause of the 
accident.
This finding constituted the first order attribution 
of responsibility which Schroeder and Linder (1976) 
claimed to be essential to the eliciting of defensive 
attributions. The Perpetrator was clearly identified as 
the causal agent, regardless of the experimental conditions. 
Any perceived similarity to him and his situation could be 
threatening and could result in defensive attributions of 
lessened responsibility. There would be no threat, how­
ever, for HSP-Sim-Perpetrators had the Perpetrator not
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been perceived as having caused the accident.
Responsibility. The other dependent measure presented 
in Table 2 is "How responsible is the Perpetrator for what 
happened at the end of the tape?". No significant differ­
ences were obtained and the mean of 7.0 was similar to a 
mean of 7.9 on the Causality variable. It appears as 
though responsibility equals causality to these subjects 
and, in fact, the two dependent variables are significant­
ly positively correlated, r(78) = .32 , £<.01.
Foreseeability and Intentionality. Table 3 contains 
the other two dependent measures being used to determine 
the assignment of responsibility for the accident. When 
asked "Do you think the reader (Perpetrator) foresaw what 
happened at the end of the tape?", a High-Low by Perpetra-
tor-Victim interaction was obtained, JF( 1, 72) = 4. 33,
£<..039, with the future potential Perpetrators attributing 
less foreseeability to the Perpetrator than the other ex­
perimental groups. It was predicted that the Sim-High-
Perpetrators would respond in this defensive fashion, but
not predicted for the Dis-High-Perpetrators. Theoretical-
[
ly, they could have relied upon their dissimilarity to 
the Perpetrator as a threat reducing strategy and proceed­
ed to assign foreseeability more in keeping with the other 
experimental conditions. Apparently, the situational 
possibility was strongly perceived and threat enough to 
future potential Perpetrators.
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When asked "Do you think that the reader (Perpetrator) intended to 
push the table?", a High-Low by Perpetrator-Victim interaction was ob­
tained, _F(1* 72) = 8.67, jd<!.004, with the future potential perpetrators 
attributing less intent to the perpetrator than the other groups. As 
with the Foreseeability measure, the lesser attributions of intent from 
the Dis-High-Perpetrators was not expected. It might be noted that the 
Dis-High-PerpetratorsT rating of personality similarity to the Perpetra­
tor of 4.7 might not have been dissimilar enough for them to not have 
been threatened by their perceived high possibility of being in a sim­
ilar circumstance as the perpetrator.
How is it that the High—Perpetrators appear to be using defensively 
lessened attributions in the Foreseeability and the Intentionality 
measures but not in the Responsibility measure? This discrepancy might 
be attributed to the ambiguity of the term responsible. As Shaver (1975) 
questioned, what is meant by responsibility? causality or moral account­
ability? As noted above, the dependent measures of Perpetrator Causality 
and Responsibility are correlated. Similarly, responses to Perpetrator 
Foreseeability and Intentionality are highly correlated, _r (78) = .77, 
jD'C.OOl. Neither Foreseeability nor Intentionality were correlated with 
Causality, :r (78) = . 169, jg_>.l and r_ (78) = .137, jp>. 1 respectively; 
but each tended to be correlated with Responsibility, (78) = .232, 
£<^.05 and r_ (78) = .,192, jd<.1 respectively. It appears as though the 
High-Perpetrators did not hold the perpetrator morally accountable for 
the accident as evidenced by their lessened attributions of foresee­
ability and intentionality to the Perpetrator. On the other hand, they 
perceived him as definitely having caused the accident and their rather 
high attributions of responsibility suggest that they tended to inter-
4 5
pret responsibility to mean causality moreso than moral 
accountability.
Chance Factors. Table 4 presents the mean ratings of 
subjects to the questions "How responsible was pure chance 
for the accident?" and "How responsible was the experimental 
set-up (table, blocks) for what happened?". The overall 
analysis of variance obtained no significant results. 
Comparing the effects of the High-Sim-Perpetrators to the 
average effect of the other treatments, however, yielded 
a tendency for the High-Sim-Perpetrators to make higher 
attributions to "pure chance" and "experimental set-up",
F(l, 72) = 3 . 59 , £<.10; F(l, 72) = 3.70 , p<.10 respect­
ively (Winer, 1971).
Perogat ion o f Vict im. Table 5 presents the measures 
which were relevant to the second prediction being tested, 
namely, that High-Sim-Victims would not endorse the just 
world belief that the Victim was deserving of and/or 
characterologically responsible for his misfortune. When 
asked "How likeable a person is the builder (Victim)?" 
no significant differences were found and the overall mean 
of 5.9 is identical to the overall rating of the likeable­
ness of the Perpetrator.
The item "How blameworthy is the builder (Victim) for 
what happened at the end of the tape?" provided a Perpe- 
trator-Victim main effect, 2?(ls 72) = 8.02 , £<.006 , with
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the subjects attending to the Victim attributing more blame 
to him. Specifically, the Sim-High-Victim group attributed 
the most blame. It appears as though the belief in a just 
world is more potent than defensively lessened attributions.
When asked "How responsible was the builder (Victim) 
for what happened at the end of the tape?", no differences 
were obtained.
Additional Analyses— Harmavoidance. A second analysis 
of variance was performed on the data using Harmavoidance 
1evel as an additional condition. It was easy to divide the 
members of a treatment cell into Above Median or Below 
Median Harmavoidance groups because each cell was represent­
ative of the subject population distribution of Harmavoid­
ance scores. The resulting analysis was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ,  
High-Low by Sim-Dis by Victim-Perpetrator by Above Median- 
Below Median. This analysis provided significant results 
on four dependent variables: Personal Similarity to Victim; 
Perpetrator Likeability; Effect of Accident: and Victim
Blame. Tables 6, 7, and 8 present these results.
The variable "How similar are the Victim’s personality 
traits to yours?" obtained an High-Low-LSP by Sim-Dis by 
Above Med-Below Med effect, F(l, 64) = 6.43, £_-^.01. The 
similarity manipulation made the most difference either 
among Below Med-High or among Above Med-Low subjects.
The combination of the two supposed threat evoking condi­
tions in the Above Med-High seems to overwhelm the system
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and negates the similarity manipulation.
When asked "Did the accident affect the builder’s 
(Victim) reward?", a Sim-Dis by Harmavoidance interaction 
was obtained, F(l, 64) = 5.81, p.<.02, with subjects who were 
either Sim-Above Median or Dis-Below Median minimizing the 
consequences of the accident, As in the previous measure, 
the presumably most threatening and the presumably least 
threatening conditions provide similar responses. The 
attributions of the least threatening group remain uninter­
pretable, unless they are construed to be an uninvolved 
group whose responses might differ as a function of their 
distance from the motivational issues confronting the other 
groups.
To the question "How likeable a person is the reader 
(Perpetrator), a Sim-Dis by Harmavoidance interaction was 
obtained, F(l, 64) = 5.37 , p < . 0 2 ,  with the Perpetrator be­
ing most negatively evaluated by subjects who are either 
Sim-Above Median or who are Dis-Below. Again, assuming 
that the Dis-Below group represents an uninvolved, "ration­
al" condition, it is possible to see in the Sim-Above nega­
tive evaluation a denial of liking that can be interpreted 
as a response to the threat —  a sort of denial of simi­
larity .
To the question "How blameworthy is the builder ( V i c ­
tim) for what happened at the end of the tape?", a HSP-LSP 
by Perpetrator-Victim by Harmavoidance interaction was ob-
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tained, F(l, 64) = 4.82, £ < . 0 3 .  When subjects believed 
that they would not likely be in a similar situation, 
those who identified with the Victim blamed him more than 
those who identified with the perpetrator. When subjects 
believed that they would be involved in a similar situation, 
both the nature of the future task and their personal dis­
positions affected the blame assigned to the Victim; the 
greatest blame was assigned by future perpetrators who were 
below the median. Once more the results of experimental 
conditions vary as a function of the personal disposition 
of Harmavoidance.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to test hypotheses gene­
rated by Shaver's defensive attribution formulation as op­
posed to those of Lerner's just-world hypothesis. In doing 
so, it was expected that a better understanding would be 
obtained of the relevant variables in the motivated attri­
bution of responsibility phenomenon. Furthermore, method­
ological Improvements were attempted in order to facili­
tate the interpretation and usefulness of research data.
In regard to the primary hypothesis that persons 
would attribute less responsibility to the perpetrator of 
an accident if they feel that they may be in a similar 
situation in the future and if they feel that they are 
similar to the perpetrator, Shaver’s defensive attribution 
model received partial support. The perceived personal 
similarity to the perpetrator did not affect the attributions 
of fate-similar subjects. Nevertheless, these subjects 
attributed less foreseeability and intentionality of the 
accident to the perpetrator and also tended to attribute 
more responsibility to chance and to the experimental set­
up. These latter attributions are not in accord with 
Lerner’s just-world prediction that the subjects would 
reject a belief in a "capricious world".
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Of particular importance was the clarification of re­
sponses of responsibility attributions by means of several 
different measures which tapped different meanings of the 
term responsibility. This technique allowed the investi­
gator rather than the subject to control the response 
interpretation.
Both Shaver’s and Lerner’s attribution models rely on 
the negative consequences of the event to evoke the parti­
cular manifestations of defensive attributions which were 
being studied in this experiment. As noted above, the nega­
tive consequences of the accident as measured by the de­
pendent variables "Did what happened at the end of the tape 
affect the Builder’s reward?" and "How much did the Builder 
make as a reward for his performance?" were not similarly 
perceived. For instance, the Similar-Above Median Harm­
avoidance subjects claimed the accident to have had a lesser 
effect on the Builder’s reward than Similar-Below Median 
Harmavoidance subjects. Furthermore, as stated earlier, 
the mean rating of 4.2 (which equates to approximately 
$3.50) as the Builder’s reward seemed rather high for a per­
formance that was apparently negated by the accident. An 
inspection of the responses to the dependent measure "How 
much did the Builder make as a reward for his performance?" 
showed a bimodal distribution of reward ratings as presented 
in Figure 1. Approximately 34% of the subjects estimated 
the Builder’s reward to be $0.00, while another 33% esti-
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Figure 1.
Bimodal Distribution of Builderfs Reward Ratings
Frequency 
of Score
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mated the Builder’s reward to be between $5.25 and $6.00.
The remaining reward estimations ranged from $0.75 to 
$6.75. The Builder was apparently seen as receiving no 
reward or as being compensated to the pre-accident level 
of performance in spite of the accident. Comments such as 
"There was a videotape record of the Builder’s performance", 
from subjects during the debriefing might explain the ease 
with which the negative consequences of the accident could 
be denied. The weakening of as important a factor as the 
negative consequences of the witnessed event may present 
a dampening influence on the production of defensive attri­
butions. One would suppose that the effect of defensive 
attributions would have been greater had the subjects been 
presented with a stimulus which was not ambiguous in re­
gard to the negative outcome of the accident. In future, 
studies, one might include as subjects only those who 
through manipulation checks are identified as having per­
ceived the experimental stimulus as was intended by the re­
searcher. Otherwise, an undetermined and unexpected amount 
of "noise" may be included with the "signal" of results.
The second prediction being tested, namely, that the 
subjects who felt that they would be in a similar situation 
as the victim of the accident, and who also felt similar to 
the victim, would not derogate the victim was not sup­
ported. Rather, the High Situational Possibility Victims 
appeared to be responding in accordance with the just-world
58,
hypothesis by finding the Victim more blameworthy than was 
found by other subjects. However, in the additional anal­
ysis including Harmavoidance, those High Situational Pos­
sibility Victims who were also Above Median Harmavoiders 
declared the Victim less blameworthy. This supports 
Shaver1s defensive attribution prediction and further 
stresses the importance he places on the interaction of 
relevant variables in attribution research, specifically 
those variables of situational possibility, personal simi­
larity, and personal dispositions.
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Appendix A 
Computer Print-Out Questionnaire 
(modified)
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERSONALITY TRAITS AND SPATIAL IMAGERY 
Fill in identifying information, then begin questionnaire. 
Name :
A g e :
Date :
Circle One: Future Builder Future Reader
Observe Builder Observe Reader 
Circle One: Similar to subjects in the film
Dissimilar to subjects in the film 
Respond to each statement by placing a slash mark on the 
line where it corresponds to the position of your feelings 
concerning the statement.
The task discriminates subjects with good spatial imagery 
from those without.
Disagree _______ /_____ /_________ £_______ /_ /________ / Agree
The tape clearly portrays the duties of the subjects.
Agree _______ /______/________ /_______ /_______ / / Disagree
Personality traits correlate with a person’s spatial imagery. 
Agree _______ /_____ /_________ /_______ /_______ /_______ / Disagree
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I understand what "transforming verbal descriptions into 
3-D figures1’ means.
Disagree / I I I / / Agree
The builder’s task is difficult.
Agree / / I I / / Disagree
The builder’s performance was poor.
Disagree I I  / / / / Agree
The reader’s performance was poor.
Agree / / I I / / Disagree
I would be able to perform the builder ’s task
Agree / / / / / / Disagree
I would rather be the builder in the task.
Agree f i l l / / Disagree
There is a x>isk for the builder in not having a guaran-
teed reward.
Disagree I I I / / / Agree
The builder’s monetary reward is adequate.
Disagree / / / / / / Agree
A person’s experiences could effect his building ability.
Agree _______ /_______/______ /______ /______ /_____ / Disagree
The PRF test is a valid measuring device for personalities. 
Disagree _______ / /______ /______ /_____ _/_____ / Agree
A
I hereby give permission for my responses to be used 
as data in this study.
Signature  __________________________
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Appendix B 
Relevant, Second Questionnaire 
PLACE A SLASH MARK ON THE LIN AT A POINT WHICH REPRESENTS 
YOUR FEELINGS CONCERNING THE QUESTION.
Did the builder cause what happened at the end of the tape?
completely not at all
caused______________________________________________caused
Did the reader cause what happened at the end of the tape?
not at all completely
cans ed _____ ____________________________________caused
Do you think the reader foresaw what happened?
not at all completely
fores aw »__ ________________________________________ f ores aw
Do you think the builder foresaw what happened?
completely not at all
foresaw______ ______________________ ________________ _f ore saw
Do you think the reader intended to push the table?
completely not at all
intended______________________________________________ intended
How responsible is the reader for what happened?
completely not at all
responsible________________    responsible
How responsible is the builder for what happened?
not at all completely
responsible________    responsible
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How conscientious a person is the reader?
completely not at all
cons c lent io us_____   conscientious
How likeable a person is the reader?
completely not at all
likeable_____________  ._______________ likeable
How likeable a person is the builder?
not at all likeable
likeable__________________________________________ completely
How much did the builder make as a reward for his perform­
ance?
$ 0 . 0 0 _ __________________________________________ $6.7 5
How similar are the builder’s beliefs and attitudes to yours?
completely not at all
similar ______________________________________  similar
How similar are the reader’s beliefs and attitudes to yours?
completely not at all
s i m i l a r ________________________________________similar
Did what happened at the end of the tape affect the build­
e r ’s reward?
completely not at all
a f f e c t_______________________________ ______________ a f f e c t
How similar are the reader’s personality traits to yours?
completely not at all
similar______________________________________________ similar
How similar are the builder’s personality traits to yours?
not at all completely
similar similar
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